On 16 December, Brookings held a public discussion on the current state of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran with foreign policy experts Suzanne Maloney, Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack. The discussion was in line of President-elect Barack Obama's new challenges in inheriting complicated foreign policy priorities from its first day in office: Afghanistan has a rapidly spreading insurgency; Iraq is struggling in winding down the U.S. mission; and Iran's nuclear aspirations and regional agenda that further complicates an already challenging foreign policy landscape.

In his opening statement, Pollack painted a picture of the improved security situation in Iraq, illustrating that in 2006 there were only sparse and reluctant adults on the streets. In 2007, the streets became traveled often by more uninhibited adults. In 2008, children are once again present in the public and social atmosphere. Despite the increasing normality of daily life, the country is still threatened of being pushed back into a state of civil war by ominous political dilemmas and ineptitudes.

Will the Shia allow the Sunni to integrate into the political system? Can the existing ministers refrain from enacting personal vendettas at the cost of civil society? Will Nouri al-Maliki continue to centralize power and declare himself the dictator of Iraq? Can the increasingly independent, confident and capable military be counterbalanced and denied the temptation of a coup d'état?

Pollack implicitly said that the U.S. alone is the single most important factor in making sure that there are free and fair elections in Iraq; that Maliki does not subvert the pluralist political system; that there is a counterweight to the increasingly strong Iraqi military; and that sectarian violence and civil war is not reverted to. However, the role that the U.S. has played in Iraq must shift. The U.S. must satisfy this responsibility with diminishing resources and authority, requiring the incoming Obama administration to manage Iraq with great skill in order to set it on the right trajectory and avoid the degeneration current progress.

The successful surge in Iraq, according to O'Hanlon, has the five powers of U.S. foreign policy decision-making agreeing on a similar clear, hold, and build strategy for Afghanistan. Although, Afghanistan is currently considered safer than Iraq statistically, momentum is towards decreased security and higher risk. As such, the powers-in-charge plan to increase capability in Afghanistan by two brigades by January 2009, followed by another two brigades in June 2009. O'Hanlon suggested that 4,000 to 5,000 troops be trainers with the intent on developing the Afghan security force. In his estimation, Afghan security forces need to total 200,000 before the United States could realistically withdraw from Afghanistan. The question is how to fund training the Afghan security force?

Maloney said that the United States faces a watershed moment as a tiresome debate has ended and most of Washington D.C. is in agreement that engagement is THE appropriate strategy for Iran. Contributing potential to this moment is the first cross factional, public, and authorized support for an Iranian dialogue with the U.S. since the Iranian revolution.

Despite the historical significance of this opportunity, Maloney warns, it is important to recognize the challenges to be surpassed in order to realize this potential. First, although during his campaign, President-elect Obama expressed willingness to engage Iran without preconditions, the incoming Obama administration must clearly distinguish its policy from that of the Bush administration. Several factors, such as P5+1, sanctions, and global economic restrictions, will maintain, and President-elect Obama cannot risk being perceived as a new face to an old policy.

The second challenge is timing, Maloney said. With Iran's upcoming presidential elections, the country is concentrated on its internal politics. The incoming Obama administration may be tempted to forestall diplomatic engagement until an outcome has been determined. However, she believes that diplomatic engagement with Iran should be irrespective of the election results.

The other side of the timing challenge is that Iran may have the motivation to make an engagement with the U.S. a prolonged process to buy time for the development of its nuclear program. If so, this will make it very challenging for the US and Iran to create mutually agreed upon guidelines, deadlines, concessions and incentives. This leads directly into the third challenge --- can Iran agree to any deal? There is evidence to show that Iran is able to mend relationships with long term adversaries, as exemplified in its relations with the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.